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A comprehensive review of the design philosophy and experience of the Apollo electrical power 
generation system is presented. The review of the system covers a period of 8 years, from 
conception through the Apollo 12 lunar-landing mission. The program progressed from the 
definition phase to hardware design, system development and qualification, and, ultimately, to 
the flight phase. Several problems were encountered; however, a technology evolved that enabled 
resolution of the problems and resulted in a fully manrated power generation system. These 
problems are defined and examined, and the corrective action taken is discussed. Several rec- 
ommendations are made to preclude similar occurrences and to provide a more reliable fuel-cell 
power system. 
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SUMMARY 
The Apollo power generation system consisted of three fuel-cell modules that were 
designed and qualified to generate electrical energy at  a rate  of approximately 2 kilo- 
watts for a 14-day mission. The fuel cells used cryogenically stored hydrogen and oxy- 
gen as the reactants, which were supplied to the fuel cells in the form of high-pressure 
gases. Thermal control of the fuel cells was provided by the use of independent thermal 
control systems that rejected heat from radiators mounted on the skin of the spacecraft. 
The Apollo fuel cell was the f i rs t  practical application of a high-temperature 
hydrogen/oxygen fuel cell. The design, because it  was selected at an early develop- 
mental stage, resulted in many inherent system-design deficiencies that made the fuel 
cells sensitive to operator e r ro r .  Thus, many operational problems were encountered 
that had to be identified and resolved. The eventual solutions to the problems created 
new functional modes and better defined nonoperating modes of the fuel cells. 
Hardware development was difficult in fuel-cell design because of the functional 
environment of the components. For example, electrolyte seals had to be developed 
that would maintain their shape and sealing capability at 500" F in a solution of potas- 
sium hydroxide. Also, a lightweight, highly reliable, long-life pump had to be devel- 
oped that would operate at 200" F in a 60-psi wet-hydrogen environment. Additionally, 
the development of a highly reliable low-power glycol pump that could function at  tem- 
perature extremes of -40" to 180" F was  required. 
After the fuel-cell components were designed, built, and tested, quantity produc- 
tion was necessary for support of the flight program. A new set of problems (such as 
process controls, contamination, spares production, and traceability) evolved. Al- 
though these were not considered major problems, careful control was required so that 
reliable f light-qualified hardware was produced. 
The Apollo space flights were relatively free of fuel-cell failures. One problem 
that was noted early in the program was related to the secondary coolant loop. Air  and 
particulate contamination held immobile i n  a one-g environment was released during 
the low-gravity phase of the flight. This phenomenon resulted in the loss of thermal- 
control capabilities for the secondary coolant loop. New checkout techniques and pro- 
cedures minimized these conditions on future flights. An oscillating condenser-exit 
temperature was another flight problem. After many tests and analyses, the cause of 
the problem was determined to be another low-gravity effect that was not detrimental 
to the fuel cell. Corrective inflight operations that could be used to control such oscil- 
lations were determined but never were required. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 8 years, the Apollo Program electrical power system progressed from the 
definition phase to the hardware design, system development and qualification, and 
ultimately, to the flight phase. Although a number of problems were encountered, res- 
olution of the problems resulted in a satisfactory electrical power system. 
The primary power generation system (PGS) that was developed had to generate 
electrical energy at a rate of approximately 2 kilowatts for a 14-day mission. The sys- 
tem had to  possess adequate mission flexibility; for example, no constraints could be 
imposed on launch dates, photographic reconnaissance time, o r  navigational observa- 
tion time. In addition, it had to be operationally adaptable to changing requirements 
for successive missions without a subsequent requirement for design changes. 
High reliability and safety that were consistent with system weight were prime 
considerations. The concept of redundancy greatly increased the reliability of most 
candidate systems. Factors affecting reliability, such as multiple s tar ts ,  were to be 
avoided, and simplicity of design was desired. 
In addition to normal operational requirements, other requirements were imposed. 
The requirements involved operational considerations for the crewmen (minimum noise 
and vibration in addition to operational simplicity), integration with other vehicle sys- 
tems, high heat-rejection temperature for heat-engine concepts, system volume, mini- 
mum development time, and minimum cost. After a number of electrical power 
systems were considered, the fuel cell system ultimately was selected. The advantages 
of the fuel cell system included the fuel-cell developmental status and availability, the 
relatively light weight of the system, and the greater degree of flexibility than existed 
in  the other systems that were considered. The use of fuel cells in place of solar 
a r rays  resulted in simplified launch preparations and rendezvous maneuvers and 
the use of less fuel for attitude-control maneuvers. Also, extended periods of non- 
solar orientation were possible for guidance fixes and star tracking. Batteries would 
be required to supply peaking power during high-load-demand periods. In addition, 
power to meet load demands during the entry phase (after the fuel cells were jettisoned) 
would be supplied by entry batteries. 
After fuel cells were selected as the PGS, the mission requirements for electri- 
cal energy were refined, and a procurement specification stipulated that the PGS would 
have the capability of generating 575 kW-hr of electrical energy from three fuel cells at 
a minimum rate  of 563 watts and at  a maximum rate of 1420 watts per fuel-cell module. 
DES I GN CONS I DERATl ONS 
Before the design for the Apollo PGS could be selected, the operational require- 
ments had to be known. After the requirements were determined, a number of 
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electrical  power system designs were developed. The design that contained the 
best  features was selected for further refinements. 
R eq u i re me n t s 
The Apollo PGS had to generate, supply, regulate, and condition all electrical 
power required by the command and service module (CSM) for  the duration of a full 
mission, including recovery but excluding the life support system requirements. The 
specific requirement was the generation of electrical energy a t  a rate  of approximately 
2 kilowatts for  a 14-day mission. 
System Select ion 
In the process  of selecting a power system to meet these requirements, all known 
so lar ,  nuclear, and chemical conversion techniques were investigated individually; ap- 
propriate combinations of individual systems also were considered. Many designs that 
were suggested by vendors and NASA were studied and rated with respect to weight, 
reliability, safety, power capability, tolerance to  the mission-environment profile, and 
mission flexibility. With respect to developmental status and availability, a require- 
ment was that all designs were to be f ree  of any known development-improvement re- 
quirements that might seriously impact program costs and schedules. 
System Description 
The system that was selected was 
composed pf three alkaline fuel cells ,  one 
of which is shown in figure 1. The sche- 
matic diagram of the PGS (fig. 2) contains 
views of the three fuel-cell modules that 
are integrated with two hydrogen-storage 
tanks and two oxygen-storage tanks. Hy- 
drogen and oxygen are used as the fuel and 
oxidizer. The resultant electrochemical 
reaction in the fuel cell produces electricity 
and water.  The water is a byproduct and 
is used for  the environmental control sys-  
tem for cooling and is consumed by the 
crewmembers.  
Each Apollo fuel-cell module pro- 
duces direct-current electrical power over 
a normal range of 563 to 1420 watts a t  a 
voltage of 27 to 31 volts. The module is 
44 inches high and 22.5 inches in diame- 
t e r  and weighs approximately 245 pounds. 
Each module is composed of four dis- 
tinct sections o r  systems: an  energy- 
conversion section, a reactant-control Figure 1. - Apollo fuel-cell module. 
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Figure 2 .  - Simplified power generation system schematic. 
section, a thermal-control and water-removal section, and the necessary instrumenta- 
tion. Except for the energy-conversion section, all of these sections a r e  included in 
the accessory portion of the fuel cell. 
The energy-conversion section, shown in figure 3,  consists of a cell stack com- 
posed of 31 alkaline series-connected cells and the associated gas manifolds and con- 
necting leads. The energy-conversion section is housed in a pressurized jacket that is 
in an insulated support assembly. The single-cell assembly (fig. 4) converts the chem- 
ical  energy of the reactants to electrical energy and byproduct water. It consists of two 
half cells; hydrogen is the anode and oxygen is the cathode. The electrolyte between the 
half cells is an 80-percent aqueous solution of potassium hydroxide (KOH). A Teflon 
seal around the cell contains the electrolyte in the cell and provides electrical insulation 
between the diaphragm portions of the electrodes. The cell operates a t  temperatures 
between 380" and 460" F and at reactant pressures  of approximately 60 psia. 
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Figure 3 .  - Energy-conversion section. 
. The primary coolant loop contains hydrogen and water in the form of superheated 
steam at 60 psi  and 430" F. The excess steam is condensed in the 160" F condenser. 
Then, the liquid/vapor/gas mixture enters the hydrogen pump/separator unit (fig. 6) 
that separates the liquid water out of the s t ream by centrifugal action and pumps the 
gaseous hydrogen back to the fuel-cell stack. The water-separator portion of the pump 
is shown in c ross  section in figure 6. Gaseous hydrogen and water enter the rotating 
The components that form the acces- 
sory section are mounted on a Y-frame 
(fig. 5). The accessory section consists 
of a nitrogen pressurization system, three 
fitting 
Id 
(electrical insulator) 
MoIyWenumlmanganese slurry, fired 
Tubing in  sulatorlcon nector 
Figure 4. - Single-cell assembly. 
regulators, a-primary loop (hydrogen and 
water vapor), a secondary loop (glycol and water), heat exchangers, motor-driven 
pumps, and plumbing. A condenser connects the two fluid loops. 
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Figure 5. - Fuel-cell accessory section. 
separation screen because of surface tension and is forced down into the pitot-tube 
pickup area  by the centrifugal force that is generated by the rotating screen and housing. 
The pickup end of the pitot tube is stationary and is submerged in the liquid water. The 
rotation of the water along with the rotating housing produces a 2-psi r a m  pressure in 
the pitot tube; this pressure is transmitted by the water to the water-removal-valve 
diaphragm and spring. This process causes the valve to open and water to be expelled 
f rom the separator into the pitot tube. If a gas bubble enters  the pitot tube, the r am 
pressure  is lowered sufficiently to cause the water-removal valve to close. Then, the 
gas bubble is forced through the pitot tube and out the unsubmerged end. The actual 
operation consists of a continuous flow of water and gas bubbles through the pitot tube, 
during which time the periodic opening of the water-removal valve occurs,  depending 
on the degree of submersion of the r am end of the pitot tube. 
Figure 6. - Block I1 hydrogen pump/separator . 
DEVELOPMENT AND FLIGHT-TEST DIFFICULTIES 
During the initial system development of the PGS, a number of problems occurred 
that necessitated further component development. During the early flight tests of the 
PGS, additional problems were noted that resulted in the need for improvements in 
service procedures and for further system refinements. 
Component Development and Production 
Development problems were encountered during the transition from prototype 
hardware to production-type components that would meet the mission requirements. 
Many of these problems were unique to the fuel-cell operations and required that new 
technology be developed. 
Electrolyte seal. - As a result of cell peripheral electrolyte-seal leakage, a con- 
siderable delay occurred in the early stage of development. After an exhaustive survey 
of materials, Teflon was selected as the seal material. The seal had to contain the 
highly concentrated potassium hydroxide, which is very corrosive (especially at 400" to 
500" F). Also, the seal  had to contain the pressure and act as an electrical insulator. 
At elevated temperatures, formed Teflon has a tendency to return to its original shape. 
Also, the surface of the seal is slick, which enables it to slip or extrude (cold flow) 
through two parallel sealing surfaces. The critical temperature at which these 
n 
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phenomena occur is close to the operating temperature of the cell (500" F). Be- 
cause no other material met the seal requirements, a decision was made to accept 
the relatively small electrical-performance penalty by operating at lower temperatures 
(nominally 400" to 425" F). Also, the flat-cell seal design was changed to an 
L-configuration, as shown in figure 4, and both mating surfaces were roughened to 
allow for better containment. This action virtually eliminated all seal leakage problems. 
Cell flooding. - The two half cells (electrodes) that form the single-cell assembly 
(fig. 4) are composed of dual-porosity sintered nickel formed from nickel powder that 
is pressed into sheets. The liquid-electrolyte-to-gas reactant interface is maintained 
within the sintered nickel by means of a controlled 10.5-psi pressure differential be- 
tween the electrolyte and the reactant compartments. If either the hydrogen or oxygen 
gas pressure is more than 2.5 psi below or 15 psi above the electrolyte pressure,  a 
breakdown of the liquid/gas interface possibly would occur. 
During the preprototype design stage of the single cells, many electrolyte leaks 
developed across the electrode interface as a result of pressure differentials that 
caused flooding, allowing KOH to enter the reactant cavities. The result was the fail- 
u re  of the individual cell to maintain an electrical load. The manufacturing procedure 
was changed so that the porosity of the nickel electrodes was more uniform, thus in- 
creasing its bubble pressure and decreasing its susceptibility to flooding. Also, a coat- 
ing of lithium-impregnated nickel oxide was added to the electrolyte side to inhibit 
oxidation; by this method, the configuration was controlled during operation. These 
changes constituted modest improvements, but the fundamental problem of ground-test 
cell flooding caused by gas-pressure imbalance remained throughout the program. This 
ground-test operational effect was minimized by the improvement of ground-support- 
equipment (WE) gas distribution systems and operational test procedures and by care- 
ful handling. 
Dendrite formation. - During qualification testing, it was discovered that, after 
two 400-hour mission duty cycles, the fuel cell shorted out internally during shutdown. 
Nickel ions dissolved from the oxygen electrode into the electrolyte and formed nickel 
dendrites when reduced at the hydrogen electrode. Eventually, the dendrites bridged 
the space between the hydrogen and oxygen electrodes (fig. 4) and resulted in  electrical 
short circuits that were internal to the affected cell. 
It was  determined empirically that the reaction rate  was  temperature and time 
dependent. Because this was a well-defined failure mechanism, the failure mode was 
circumvented by means of operational procedures. A criterion was established requir- 
ing the removal of the fuel cells from the spacecraft if an equivalent life of 840 hours 
(based on an operating temperature of 400" F) accumulated before launch. Fuel-cell 
operation during the buildup and checkout of spacecraft was minimized; as a result, no 
fuel cells have been removed from spacecraft because of the equivalent-life operational 
rule. 
Pressure vessels. - Titanium proved to be an excellent pressure-vessel material 
for  fuel cells; however, a higher degree of quality control was required during the man- 
ufacturing process than was imposed originally. Two titanium pressure vessels are 
used on each fuel cell: one on the GN2-storage tank and one on the GN2-blanket- 
pressure-tank assembly. Contamination and inadequate process control caused the 
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tanks to have defective welds that resulted in failures. The two components that were 
affected and the welds that were involved are  shown in figure 7. 
Flange to formed sheet metal 
dome (weld I1 
-Cover 
f Flange-lo-cylinder weld+ w Jacket Longitudinal cylinder weld Dome-lo-cylinder weld 
Power-section 
pressure vessel 
lapproximately 20 i n .  long, 
12-in. diameter) 
Figure 7. - The GN2-blanket-pressure 
tank and power-section pressure- 
vessel  assembly components and 
welds. 
The first indication of a titanium-weld 
problem was a GN2-storage-tank girth-weld 
failure that occurred during a component- 
acceptance test. The cause of failure was 
oxygen contamination of the weld caused by 
the use of improper procedures for a girth- 
weld repair. Because of the sensitivity of 
pressure-vessel failure during flight and 
the resultant damage that could have been 
caused by such a failure, a thorough review 
of all procedures and processes that had 
been implemented was made, and all tita- 
nium welds were inspected for flaws. Be- 
cause of the hydriding that occurred in many 
of the titanium welds, all of the high- 
pressure storage vessels were rejected. 
As a result, improved procedures were 
implemented that included the requirement 
for the new GN2-storage tanks to be welded 
inside a hard chamber (instead of a bag) 
that had a capability of vacuum purge and 
inert-gas backfill. The dewpoint was con- 
trolled to -30" F maximum. A single weld 
pass was allowed (previously, two passes 
were allowed), and no weld repairs were permitted. Each tank- was X-rayed, the in- 
side and outside surfaces were inspected visually, and the welds were dye-penetrant- 
inspected before and after a proof test of 3000 psi and a tank helium-leak check. The 
weld specificatdon was revised to prohibit high-density inclusions. The quality-control 
samples were required to be with the tanks during the weld and stress-relief operations. 
All the procedures were reflected in the traceability records that were made more spe- 
cific. When applicable, similar procedures were incorporated into the production of 
the GN2-blanket-pressure tanks. The precautions that were taken have resulted in no 
recurrence of failures in fuel-cell pressure vessels after acceptance tests were 
conducted. 
Ceramic-insulator leakage. - Each fuel cell has a hydrogen and oxygen reactant in- 
let and a hydrogen and oxygen reactant outlet (fig. 4). The inlets of the cells a r e  joined 
to form a manifold (that is; the hydrogen inlets of the 31 cells a r e  joined with a common 
supply), as are the outlets, as shown in figure 3. The piglet tubes between each cell and 
its manifold are isolated electrically by means of ceramic insulators (figs. 3 and 4), to 
maintain the desired series electrical connection. 
During the acceptance test of one fuel cell, excessive hydrogen was detected in 
the GN2 blanket, indicative of leaking ceramic insulators in hydrogen piglets. This 
indication was confirmed by means of additional tests.  It was shown that the manufac- 
turer  had produced one lot of these insulators for which a high-temperature bake cycle 
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and assembly leak-check procedures were omitted. The fuel cells that had insulators 
from this lot were recalled; the insulators were replaced with properly processed 
ones. All insulator records were reviewed for quality control to ensure that necessary 
tests and procedures had not been omitted. More stringent quality-control procedures 
were instituted, and the ceramic-insulator leakage problem did not recur.  
Ground Tests 
Ground tests indicated that the PGS could operate while the fuel cells were inte- 
grated with the spacecraft systems during extrerne environmental conditions. During 
these tests, incompatibilities were noted in the reliability of the components in the 
integrated systems; definition and correction were required. 
Accumulator. - An accumulator (fig. 8) is provided as part of the water-glycol 
coolant system to maintain a constant coolant pressure, regardless of the volumetric 
changes associated with coolant temperature variations. This pressure control is ac- 
complished by imposing a regulated nitrogen-blanket pressure on the coolant system by 
the use of a flexible bladder. 
Approximately 
r 4 i n .  1 
i 
Bladder - 
Nitrogen - 
Water -ql ycol 
I 
Figure 8. - Coolant accumulator 
assembly. 
nately 
During early system tests, it was 
determined that the accumulator size was 
not sufficient to function as a pressure- 
control device for the total temperature 
range of the fuel cell. The problem was 
noted during boilerplate 14 tests,  at which 
time the coolant pressure increased be- 
cause thermal expansion of the water-glycol 
extended the accumulator bladder to its 
limit. A larger accumulator w a s  added to 
production fuel cells, and the problem did 
not recur. 
Cell separation. - The electrolyte, 
80 percent KOH, is a porous solid at am- 
bient temperature. Therefore, small quan- 
tities of reactant gases can permeate the 
electrolyte as it dries and hardens during 
shutdown of the fuel cell. The early shut- 
down depressurization procedure was ac- 
complished by opening the reactant-gas 
purge valves and rapidly reducing the cell 
pressure.  When the cells are rapidly de- 
pressurized, the forces exerted by the ex- 
pansion of the trapped gases can break the 
bond between the electrode and the solidified 
Dotassium hvdroxide. This process is called 
cold popping. On restart  of a cold-popped ckll, the trapped reactant gas forms a bubble 
between the electrolyte and the electrode. It manifests itself a s  a reduction in the ac- 
tive electrode area,  with a resultant loss of performance. 
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The occurrence of cold popping was virtually eliminated by careful adherence to 
a controlled, slow depressurization of the cell reactant gases, which allowed the re- 
actant trapped in the solidifying electrolyte to  diffuse out. 
Water-glycol pump. - Several problems were associated with the coolant pump 
(fig. 9), including leakage and failure to start .  The leakage was  noted f i rs t  during tests 
Carbon end plates 
Q u i l l A  seal 
shafl 
Figure 9. - Block I1 water-glycol pump. 
on spacecraft 012. The leakage was caused 
by a damaged seal surface under the motor- 
to-housing O-ring seal.  Although initially 
the damaged area under the seal  was not 
large enough to cause leakage, corrosion of 
the damaged area outside the seal was 
augmented by the air environment. This 
augmentation caused an enlargement of the 
damaged area and the growth of a large 
crystal under the O-ring seal, allowing 
leakage. To prevent recurrence of the 
problem, all water-glycol pump housings 
(3561'6 aluminum) were electroless nickel 
plated to res i s t  damage o r  corrosion. No 
recurrence of this problem was noted. 
During tes ts  on spacecraft 2TV- 1 , the 
water-glycol pumps failed to s tar t  after 
being dormant for several  weeks. By in- 
vestigation, i t  was determined that the 
pump was sticking. The sticking was 
caused by deposition of nickel phosphate in 
the pump gears,  which was caused by the 
presence of chlorides in the coolant. The 
water-glycol mixture that was used for servicing the 2TV-1 radiators did not require a 
chloride analysis. A sample of the water-glycol mixture that was used was analyzed; 
the chlorine content was 37 par ts  per  million. Concentrations of greater than 25 to 
30 par ts  per  million are considered to be intolerable from a corrosion standpoint; con- 
sequently, the chlorine content was limited during servicing to 5 par ts  per  million 
maximum. 
During the normal acceptance tes ts  of new hardware, several  of the water-glycol 
pumps tended to stick during the f i rs t  s tar t .  By investigation, it was shown that, during 
a final flush and dryout procedure before storage, a residue was left on the shaft and 
that the shaft could not rotate because the pump has a low (4 inch-ounce) starting torque. 
After the water-glycol pumps were started, the residue was dissolved and no further 
problems occurred. A new rinse and dryout procedure that eliminated further problems 
of this type was incorporated. 
Hydrogen-vent port. - Two reactant purge ports,  one for  hydrogen and one for oxy- 
gen, a r e  provided on each fuel cell to allow the purging of impurities (nonreactant gases) 
that may accumulate in internal cell reactant cavities. Under extreme thermal condi- 
tions, during the spacecraft 008 tes ts  on the  original spacecraft design, the water vapor 
condensed and froze at the purge-port opening, preventing further hydrogen purging. 
Two heaters were added to subsequent flight vehicles; these heaters are connected 
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electrically in parallel for redundancy. Each heater has two elements that operate at 
2 watts per element. The heaters are activated 20 minutes before a fuel-cell hydrogen 
purge and are  turned off 10 minutes after purge termination. 
Water relief valve. - The fuel cell does not have a water relief valve as such; 
however, the environmental control system (ECS) has such a valve that interfaces with 
the fuel cell system. Through this valve, water is removed that is generated by the 
fuel cell when both ECS water tanks are full and the water pressure exceeds 45 psia. 
Failure of th i s  valve to relieve and vent water causes the fuel cell to absorb an exces- 
sive amount of water, thus requiring increased volume and resulting in cell flooding and 
subsequent failure. 
Certain ground conditions of the ECS could cause back pressures in excess of 
45 psia that would be applied to the fuel-cell water supply system as a result of the 
water head pressure caused by the one-g force of the earth. This problem was avoided 
by verification of the position of the ECS tank-valve switches (three) and by the place- 
ment of a redline maximum value (12 to 15 pounds) on the amount of water in each tank. 
This problem has not occurred. 
Hydrogen pump/separator . - The fuel-cell hydrogen pump/separator (fig. 6) 
serves two functions : it circulates moist hydrogen from the fuel-cell stack through the 
condenser, regenerator, and inline heater and back to the stack; it removes the con- 
densed water from the hydrogen loop and discharges this water to the spacecraft water- 
collection tanks of the ECS. The hydrogen gas that is pumped through the motor 
eliminates the need for shaft seals in the hydrogen pump and cools the motor. Because 
the hydrogen is saturated with water vapor, many electrical problems were caused un- 
til a satisfactory waterproofing epoxy insulation was found and a satisfactory method of 
application of the epoxy was developed. 
FI ight Experiences 
Anomalies occurred on the early Apollo short-duration flights in both Block I and 
Block 11 fuel cells. During later flights of longer duration, the effects of zero g, cou- 
pled with the thermal cycling, were a problem in the operation of the fuel cells. The 
anomalies were corrected, and operational procedures were incorporated that resulted 
in satisfactory fuel-cell performance. 
craft 011 ( the f i rs t  use of fuel cells on an Apollo flight), which had two operable fuel 
cells (numbers 1 and 3). Fuel cell 2 had been rendered inoperative before launch be- 
cause of a checkout-equipment-wiring e r ro r .  During the latter portion of the flight, 
the condenser-exit temperatures of fuel cells 1 and 3 were out of regulation (high), al- 
though the overall performance was unaffected. It was concluded that the cooling capac- 
ity of the secondary coolant loop was reduced, and the most likely cause was attributed 
to inadequate radiator servicing that resulted ir, coolant-pump cavitation. To prevent 
recurrence of the problem, a coolant-system compressibility test was designed to iden- 
tify entrapped air in the PGS radiators to verify adequate system servicing. A maxi- 
mum of 8 cubic centimeters of air at  a temperature of 120" F and at a normal operating 
pressure of 54 rt 2 psia was allowed. The compressibility checks were performed 
twice on all vehicles after the occurrence of the problem on spacecraft 011: once just 
Block I flight anomalies. - The only Block I fuel-cell anomaly was on space- 
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after coolant-system servicing and again as late as possible before a launch. The ap- 
plication of these procedures virtually eliminated the possibility that preflight leaks o r  
gas bubbles of significant volume would occur in the fuel-cell secondary coolant system. 
As a result, this problem was eliminated. 
Block I1 flight anomalies. - When the CSM was maneuvered into lunar orbit, ex- 
t reme operational conditions were encountered as a result of exposure of the fuel cells 
to transient thermal conditions. 
Condenser-exit temperature: The 
condenser-exit temperature (TCE) sensor 
is a functional part of the secondary water- 
glycol coolant loop (fig. lo), the output of 
which is used to maintain a temperature 
equilibrium in the water condenser of the 
hydrogen system. This allows a constant 
water-vapor pressure in the inlet-hydrogen 
manifold throughout the operating power 
range of the fuel cell, which, in turn, con- 
trols the water content of the electrolyte. 
Condenser-exit temperature anomalies 
were noted on all flights except the Apollo 8 
mission. The anomalies were in two cate- 
gories. The f i rs t  anomaly was evident on 
the Apollo 7 and 9 missions and was charac- 
terized by TCE excursions to higher-than- 
normal temperatures, which were indicative 
of restricted secondary-coolant bypass- 
valve travel. By analysis of the data, it 
was shown that the restriction was caused 
by coolant-loop contamination on both 
flights. The coolant system had a history 
of chronic contamination. The combination 
of the coolant, coolant-corrosion inhibitors, 
and aluminum Dlumbing caused the forma- 
c 
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Figure 10.- Schematic diagram of fuel 
cell system. 
tion of a gelatinous product after dormant-stand periods of more than 3 months during 
which no loop circulation occurred. The gelatinous product, released in a zero-g en- 
vironment during flight, restricted the fluid travel in certain critical control valves 
and caused mission-constraint problems. The servicing procedures were revised for 
all subsequent spacecraft that had not already been serviced. Thereafter, the coolant 
systems were serviced with water-glycol a t  the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center 
rather than at the spacecraft manufacturing facility to reduce the dormant-stand time. 
Also, the coolant-sampling schedules were revised to include the requirement for more 
frequent sampling of the coolant loops. If any samples were questionable, the coolant 
loops were flushed with fresh water-glycol while the radiator panels were vibrated man- 
ually in an effort to shake adherent contamination loose. The flush and vibration opera- 
tions apparently minimized the contamination because this type of anomaly was noted 
in only one of the fuel cells on the remaining Apollo flights. Spacecraft 107 (Apollo 11) 
and the subsequent spacecraft were retrofitted with fuel cells that had a modified 
Block I secondary-coolant bypass valve in place of the Block 11 valve. By means of 
testing, it had been shown that the Block I retrofit valve was far less susceptible to 
contamination than was  the Block II valve. The TCE excursions of this type did not 
occur in fuel cells that were installed in spacecraft subsequent to that used on the 
Apollo 9 mission. 
On the Apollo 10 mission, 18" F amplitude (peak-to-peak) TCE oscillations at  a 
frequency of approximately 2 cycles per minute were noted in fuel cell 2 during lunar 
orbital flight (fig. 11). Fuel cell 2 was  
operating at a load that was higher than 
normal at the time because of the pump 
circuit problem in fuel cell 1 that caused 
the temporary electrical isolation of that 
fuel cell. The overall fuel-cell perform- 
ance was unaffected, but the caution-and- 
warning alarm for low TCE was tripped 
repeatedly and had to be reset  manually 
every 5 minutes, creating a nuisance for 
the crewmembers. The oscillations tended 
to damp out at radiator exit temperatures 
of 110" to 120" F and recommence at  tem- 
peratures of 60" to 80" F. Five separate 
instances of the oscillations occurred. 
After an extensive examination of the flight 
data, the presence of a periodic disturbance 
was noted in the TCE and was characterized 
by a 1.5" to 2.0" F drop over a 2-second 
period with an approximate 10-second re-  
covery time to the original temperature 
(fig. 12). Periodic disturbances were 
present on this fuel cell throughout the 
Apollo 10 flight. Typically, the disturb- 
ances were 8 to 10 minutes apart and in- 
creased to a frequency of 4 to 5 minutes at 
loads above 30 to 35 amperes on the affected 
fuel cell and served as the trigger mecha- 
nismfor the oscillations. The other two fuel 
cells were unaffected. By the use of com- 
puterized analytical studies and ground tests 
at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center 
(MSC) Thermochemical Test Area (TTA), 
it was shown that TCE oscillation was a 
function of load and radiator temperature 
and that induced oscillations could always 
be damped out by reducing the fuel-cell 
load. Both the analysis and test program 
confirmed that the oscillations were not 
divergent and caused no damage to the sys- 
tem. The only concern was the effect of 
the repeated caution-and-warning alarms on 
the crewmembers. 
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disturbance. 
An extensive review of all previous flight data resulted in proof that this type of 
disturbance occurred in at least one fuel cell per spacecraft on all Block II flights. Ex- 
tensive investigation of the cause of the TCE disturbance was indicative that water slug- 
ging out of the primary (hydrogen) loop condenser in a zero-g environment w a s  the 
most probable cause. Because of the absence of a gravity field, the water probably did 
not leave the condenser in a uniform manner, but tended to accumulate at the condenser- 
exit plenum until some critical level was  reached, at which time the subcooled water 
was released in the form of a fairly large globule. Presumably, the subcooled water 
contacted the TCE probe and the secondary-loop bypass-valve-control sensor, causing 
the control disturbance and resulting valve oscillations under the high loads and low 
radiator temperatures that occurred in lunar orbit on the Apollo 10 mission. 
Provisions were made in flight procedures to unload a fuel cell that exhibited an  
oscillating TCE. Through the Apollo 16 mission, however, no other fuel cell has dem- 
onstrated this phenomenon, probably because all three fuel cells have shared loads 
throughout all other missions. 
Hydrogen pump: During the Apollo 10 mission, a short circuit in the alternating- 
current pump package of fuel cell 1 caused the associated circuit breaker to t r ip  open. 
The breaker would not reset;  thus, a permanent short was indicated. Fuel cell 1 was 
removed immediately from the bus because both the hydrogen and coolant pumps were 
inoperative. This fuel cell was maintained in an operative standby mode by placing it 
on the bus when the fuel-cell-stack temperature reached 370" F and open circuiting it 
when the stack temperature reached 420" F. After the hydrogen-pump failure in fuel 
cell 1, the maintenance of this fuel cell in the operative standby mode was accomplished 
by periodic loading, which caused the concentration of water in the electrolyte to in- 
crease eventually to approximately 33 percent. At this concentration, the fuel cell soon 
would have flooded if water could not have been removed. A continuous hydrogen purge 
was initiated to reduce the water concentration after approximately 167 hours of the 
flight. After 3 hours, at which time the fuel cell was  sufficiently dry, the purge valve 
was closed and the hydrogen vent-line heater was turned off. 
Circuit analysis, inverter testing, and review were indicative that the failure 
probably was a phase-to-phase short circuit in the hydrogen-pump stator windings, 
probably caused by insulation breakdown. Because the motor windings are exposed to 
hot, wet hydrogen, the limited life of the motors is attributed to the basic design. In 
endurance testing, the minimum length of time before a motor stator failed was 
1000 hours; the maximum time before a failure was 3960 hours. Except for a major 
redesign of the hydrogen pump, no procedural o r  design changes could be identified 
that would enhance the reliability of the pump. Consequently, the use of the pump was 
retained throughout the flight program without hardware changes. This type of failure 
did not occur in any flight fuel cell other than in the one on the Apollo 10 mission. 
Hydrogen purge flow and pressure excursion: After the extended purge of the 
flooded fuel cell  on the Apollo 10 spacecraft, the hydrogen-supply flow failed to shut 
off completely. Normally, hydrogen flow should have decreased to zero in less than 
1 minute; however, the flow ratedecreased very slowly. The purge valve was reopened, 
and the flow rate  increased to the upper limit, which was indicative that the purge valve 
was functioning. The valve was closed again, but the flow decrease was still very slow. 
After approximately 30 minutes, as the flow rate approached zero, the regulated 
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hydrogen pressure for fuel cell 1 began to increase and reached a maximum pressure 
of 72 psia before it decreased slowly to the normal pressure of 62 psia (fig. 13). 
A test program was conducted at the 
:so vendor facility to test the flight hardware 
under simulated environmental conditions f m  
,n at the time of failure. During the tests,  
g ,  the regulator temperature reached -23" F 
L 24 in 5 minutes and reached -100" F in 15 min- 
e 16 U t e s  during hydrogen purges. At a tempera- 
I ; m  
ture below -10" F, both the regulator supply 
- and relief (vent) valves, also a part  of the 
regulator assembly, leaked because the 
seals stiffened and did not conform to the 
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Figure 13*- Hydrogen rate and the regulator temperature increased to pressure after purge. 
The test results were indicative that the extended hydrogen purge in flight without 
a hydrogen-preheat capability created low temperatures in the regulator; the consequent 
leakage of both regulator seats was the reason for the continued flow. Both the purge 
line and the vent line a r e  vented overboard through a common header, and the header is 
protected from freezing by the heaters that were discussed previously. In this instance, 
the heaters were turned off when the purge valve was closed; thus, the continued vent 
through the regulator caused cooling and subsequent freezing in the overboard vent line. 
Normally, the regulator controls overpressure by venting on the downstream side. 
Consequently, blockage of the vent line caused an increase in regulated hydrogen pres- 
sure .  Subsequently, tests at the TTA resulted in proof that subcooled hydrogen can be 
purged safely and continuously for a t  least 9.5 hours if the reactant-preheat capability 
is maintained. 
A change was incorporated in the Apollo Operations Handbook requiring that the 
vent-line heater be kept on for 10 minutes after the termination of a hydrogen purge. 
Extended hydrogen purging was not required after the Apollo 10 mission. 
Hydrogen gas in potable water : Gaseous hydrogen (GH2) in the spacecraft potable 
water was a problem on all manned Apollo flights. The operation of the fuel-cell pump/ 
separator causes expulsion of water that is free of gas except for the natural absorption 
of GH2 in water at 60 psi  and 160" F. When the environment of the water is changed to 
that of the potable-water tank (25 psi, 80" F), 3 X 
of gaseous hydrogen is expelled from each pound of water that is collected from the 
fuel cell. The theoretical GH liberation value was shown and verified in controlled 
tests at the MSC. 
pound (10.3 cubic centimeters) 
2 
The hydrogen that was entrained in the potable water posed no hazards to the 
crewmen or missions but did represent a nuisance when the water was used by causing 
uneven water-flow slugging and some physical discomfort to the crewmen from the gas 
accumulation in their digestive systems. A hydrogen-gas separator was added to the 
ECS potable water system to reduce the occurrence of this problem. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. System selection/design criteria should include susceptibility to damage as 
a result of operational e r rors .  To supplement these cri teria,  ground-support equip- 
ment should be designed so that, when a hardware failure occurs, the mode of failure 
will preclude damage to the spacecraft hardware. Also, thorough training programs 
on fuel-cell operation should be conducted for engineers and technicians who per- 
form field operations in this area to ensure adequate protection in case of off-design 
1 conditions. 
During the course of the Apollo Program, the fuel cell was proven to be a rugged, 
reliable, and versatile electrical-power-generation device. The fuel cell operated 
satisfactorily during spacecraft launch/boost vibration, in zero g, and in a space/ 
vacuum environment. The fuel cell met all electrical demands that were imposed on it 
from low (translunar coast) to high (Apollo 10 two fuel-cell return) power levels. 
The experience gained from the ground- and flight-test phases of the Apollo fuel- 
cell program was indicative of certain hardware design and operational sensitivities 
that, although not considered major problems, required a great deal of time and effort 
to correct or work around. Some of the problems were unique to the fuel cell; other 
problems were caused by integration with other spacecraft systems, 
Operational e r ro r s  caused the costly failure of several fuel cells during early 
servicing and checkout operations in the Apollo Program. The high frequency of this 
occurrence was caused by the complexity of the fuel cells and their sensitivity to off- 
design conditions. After the fuel cell was  operating and was on internal spacecraft 
reactants , the system operated reliably. 
Contamination, particularly in circulating-f luid systems (for which hardware 
tolerances a r e  critical), was  a serious problem for spacecraft subsystems, as evi- 
denced by the chronic contamination of the fuel-cell coolant loops caused by the forma- 
tion of a gelatinous product after dormant-stand periods during which no loop circulation 
occurred. These problems were minimized before subsequent flights by means of 
ground flush and vibration procedures that (presumably) removed most of the gelatinous 
product from the coolant loops. 
The fuel-cell condenser-exit-temperature disturbance that occurred during the 
Block II flights is believed to have been caused by a condensation phenomenon in the 
zero-g environment. Enough evidence was produced during ground tests to verify this 
as the most likely cause of the disturbance. The apparent instability of the fuel cell 
under these conditions was shown by a mathematical model that represented the fuel- 
cell module. 
The redundancy philosophy that was instituted by the fuel cell system designers 
resulted in system and mission flexibility. The value of redundant powerplants was 
evident during the Block 11 flights, during which a fuel cell was shut down and had no 
effect on the accomplishment of the mission objectives. 
To preclude similar problems on future spacecraft and to provide a more reliable 
fuel-cell power system, the following recommendations a r e  made. 
2. System and spacecraft interfaces should be defined carefully, and the defini- 
tion should be adhered to during subsystem design and integration phases. 
3 .  The compatibility of circulating fluids with system hardware must be verified 
thoroughly by ground testing. 
4. All  fluid loops should have filters installed upstream of all critical 
components. 
5.  Critical automatic control devices, such as the transducer used to control the 
water-vapor pressiire in the hydrogen loop, should be used in a manner that will pre- 
clude control-sensor operation in a two-phase-fluid medium. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, October 14, 1972 
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